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A THEORY OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
Nathan B. Oman* 
INTRODUCTION  
When legal theorists reflect on the law they often do so at one of two 
levels of abstraction. On one hand, there are discussions devoted to the 
question, “What is law?” They seek to provide an account that makes sense 
of law in the broadest sense as a social phenomenon. This is the terrain of 
H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law and the debates among natural lawyers, 
interpretivists, and the multiplying sects of legal positivists that Hart has 
spawned.1 On the other hand, there is of late a growing body of theoretical 
literature devoted to particular substantive areas of law. Hence, for exam-
ple, we have debates over the normative foundations of contract law or the 
analytic coherence of tort law.2 This Article asks a question pitched at an 
intermediate concept: what is civil liability? 
Civil liability is not the same thing as the concept of law writ large. 
Nor can it be reduced to a particular substantive body of law such as torts, 
contracts, or restitution. As this Article demonstrates, it also cannot be re-
duced to the law of remedies, although the structure of that law has much to 
teach us about the nature of civil liability.3 Rather, when lawyers apply the 
law of torts or contracts to a set of facts, they construct an argument whose 
conclusion will be either “the defendant is liable” or “the defendant is not 
liable.” To be sure, we often speak of contractual liability or tort liability.4 
  
 * Professor, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful for helpful comments from Jason Solo-
mon and the participants at a conference at King’s College London, where I presented an earlier version 
of this Article. Alex Lurie provided excellent research assistance. As always, I thank Heather. 
 1 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986) (setting forth an interpretive theory of 
law); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 280-81 (1980) (setting forth a natural law 
theory of law); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-82 (1961) (setting forth a positivist theory of 
law).  
 2 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1 (1981) (offering a theory of contract law); 
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 5 (2004) (offering a summary of contemporary contract law 
theory); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3-4 (1995) (offering a theory of tort law).  
 3 See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and Pri-
vate Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (2011) (offering a detailed discussion of the law governing dam-
ages in order to defend civil recourse theory against corrective justice theory). 
 4 See, e.g., Ramp Operations, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(“[C]ontractual liability was expressly excluded from the scope of the insurance policy.”); Terry v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 677 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that the lan-
guage of section 5(b) of the Act that refers to a legal liability to pay damages refers to liability in tort, 
not contractual liability under an underinsured motorist policy.”). 
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We understand both things, however, to be instances of a single phenome-
non. The adjective is etiological, telling us how liability arises, rather than 
constitutive, marking off dramatically different legal phenomena. Hence, 
the law of remedies provides rules regarding possible responses to the fact 
of civil liability. Generally, however, the law of remedies is indifferent to 
how civil liability arises.5 Levying on a tort judgment is usually identical to 
levying on a restitution judgment. Of course nothing is ever entirely simple 
in the law. Hence, for example, the availability of equitable relief in con-
tracts involving personal services differs from the availability of such rem-
edies in nuisance cases.6 Even here, however, we can speak coherently of 
the application of a single irreparable injury rule to differing factual cir-
cumstances.7 
Broadly speaking, reflection on civil liability as such falls into two 
camps: liability as duty and liability as cost. These camps in turn map onto 
broader divisions within legal theory between moral theories of law versus 
economic theories of law, the ex post perspective versus the ex ante per-
spective, and deontological theories versus consequentialist theories. Both 
the duty theory and cost theory, however, mischaracterize the way that lia-
bility relates plaintiffs and defendants to one another and in so doing ob-
scure the role of civil liability in a liberal political order. This Article offers 
a third theory, arguing that civil liability is first and foremost a kind of vul-
nerability to private aggression. Admittedly, civil liability sharply limits the 
extent of both the defendant’s vulnerability and the plaintiff’s lines of at-
tack. The plaintiff cannot act against the defendant until a court has de-
clared the defendant liable; generally, the plaintiff must act through a gov-
ernment agent such as a sheriff, and the scope of what a victorious plaintiff 
can do to a defeated defendant’s person and property is constrained. Still, a 
declaration of liability means that the defendant is now vulnerable to the 
plaintiff’s agency in a way he was not previously vulnerable.  
Upon a moment’s reflection, the fact that so much of our law—
essentially all of the substantive corpus iuris devoted to the imposition of 
civil liability—is concerned with creating and defining vulnerability to pri-
vate aggression is odd. At least since Thomas Hobbes, the state—and by 
extension the law—has been seen as a solution to the problem of vulnera-
bility. The purpose of the state is to suppress private aggression. The liberal 
  
 5 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993) (“The law of 
judicial remedies determines the nature and scope of the relief to be given to a plaintiff once that plain-
tiff has established a substantive right by appropriate in-court procedures.”). 
 6 See generally id. (“Availability of particular remedies depends much on the facts of the case.”). 
 7 See generally id. § 2.5(1) (“In many instances courts formulate the adequate legal remedy rule 
by saying that equitable relief is denied unless the plaintiff could show that, without such relief, he 
would suffer an irreparable harm.”); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 693 (1990) (“[Courts] invoke the irreparable injury rule as well. Some-
times they rely solely or principally on the irreparable injury rule, and leave the application of some 
more specific rule merely implicit in their statement of the case.”). 
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theorists who followed Hobbes have been justifiably suspicious of the in-
creasing competence of the state and have sought to set forth the limits of 
its legitimate reach. By and large, however, they have tended to agree with 
Hobbes on the basic task of the law: protecting members of the community 
from aggression. To be sure, they have disagreed as to whether what was 
being protected is the mere peace of the commonwealth or some bundle of 
rights. They have agreed, however, that the first task of the law is the sup-
pression of private aggression. The theory of civil liability put forward in 
this Article challenges this basic assumption. The law does not suppress 
private aggression. Rather, law limits and channels it.  
Why would this be so? This Article argues civil liability responds to 
problems created by the very success of the modern state in suppressing 
private aggression. In particular, that success creates two problems. First, 
people who are invulnerable to retaliation face fewer costs to misbehavior. 
It is easier for them to renege on their agreements and engage in misbehav-
ior toward others without fear of retaliation. Admittedly, one might solve 
such problems by further expanding the punishments meted out by the gov-
ernment. Civil liability, however, represents another solution, namely the 
careful relaxing of the protection provided by the modern state. We allow 
plaintiffs to act against defendants in tightly controlled circumstances and 
within tightly circumscribed limits. In so doing, we render agents vulnera-
ble to one another and thus encourage peaceful cooperation. The second 
problem is that the very success of the modern state in suppressing wrong-
doing tends to render victims, especially law-abiding victims, passive in the 
face of wrongs. There is value, however, in letting victims be active in the 
face of those that harm them. By allowing them to be actors in their own 
stories—rather than passive spectators—we let them hold those that have 
harmed them responsible.  
Viewing civil liability as a form of vulnerability also helps to organize 
contemporary private law theory. That theory is generally deeply fragment-
ed. For example, theories of tort law and contract law often proceed without 
deeply engaging one another. This should make theorists of private law 
uneasy. Despite their differences, for example, both tort law and contract 
law share many of the same features. Both are bilaterally structured, relat-
ing plaintiffs and defendants to one another as alleged victim and alleged 
legal wrongdoer. Both of them involve remedies that are in some sense 
transitive, requiring defendants to pay plaintiffs or carry out some action in 
favor of plaintiffs. Finally, both fields are plaintiff centered, giving victims 
control over the decision to sue, prosecuting suit, and seeking any particular 
remedy. Despite these similarities, however, the kinds of substantive theo-
ries offered to justify tort and contract law seem remarkably dissimilar. This 
Article argues that what these fields share with one another is the basic fea-
ture of civil liability. By understanding civil liability as vulnerability, we 
are able to ask questions that get at the conceptual relationship between 
differing fields of private law. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II look 
at the two most common views of civil liability: duty and cost. Part III ar-
gues that neither of these theories adequately captures the concept of civil 
liability, which is best understood as a form of vulnerability. Part IV 
sketches out the problems for which civil liability is a solution. Finally, 
Part V relates the theory of civil liability offered in this Article to contem-
porary debates in private law theory.  
I. LIABILITY AS DUTY  
It is natural to think of law in terms of duties. We speak easily of the 
duty to keep a contract, the duty to respect the property of others, or the 
duty to refrain from unjustified harm to another’s person.8 Indeed, if we 
think of substantive areas of law as either imposing legal duties or else as 
granting the power to create legal duties, then perhaps civil liability is simp-
ly a conclusion that one has failed to comply with a set of legal duties.9 
Hence, at the conclusion of a lawsuit involving breach of contract, the dec-
laration that the defendant is liable simply means that the defendant has 
failed to perform the duties imposed on him by the contract. 
A duty theory of civil liability, however, requires more than simply a 
failure to comply with a legal duty. After all, to be found guilty of a crime 
is also a conclusion that one has failed to comply with a legal duty. Yet the 
divide between criminal guilt and civil liability matters. We speak at times 
of criminal liability, but we are talking about something that is quite differ-
ent from civil liability.10 Being found guilty of a crime has different legal 
consequences, different social repercussions, and a different cultural mean-
ing.11 
  
 8 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 337, 348 (1872) (“But where the party by 
his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may . . . .”); 
Wise v. W. Union Tel. Co., 172 A. 757, 760 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934) (“Two of the three great main heads 
of duty with which the law of torts is concerned are: (1) The duty to abstain from willful injury; and (2) 
The duty to respect the property of others.”). 
 9 See generally Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1727-28 (2008) (discussing contract as a power-conferring rule). 
 10 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blame-
less Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 694 (1993) (“Conventional lay wisdom holds that 
criminal liability and criminal commitment are different from civil liability and civil commit-
ment . . . .”). 
 11 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 785 
(1989) (“Criminalization and other repressive measures deny people, to a substantial degree, control 
over the course of their lives. By attaching the stigma of criminal conviction, by disrupting people’s 
lives through the processes of trial and conviction, and often through imprisonment, they affect not 
merely the ability to engage in one particular activity but the general control one has over the course of 
one’s life.”). 
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John Austin provides one way of understanding the relationship be-
tween substantive legal duties and civil liability. Austin formulated a dis-
tinction between what he called primary rights and duties and secondary 
rights and duties.12 Primary rights and duties are those that we associate 
with substantive areas of law such as contracts, torts, or property. Hence, 
for example, we say that the law of negligence imposes on everyone a pri-
mary duty to exercise the care of a reasonable person in avoiding injury to 
the person or property of another.13 Likewise, the law of property centers on 
a property owner’s right to exclude others from his property and to enjoy 
the economic benefits generated by the property, such as harvesting timber 
from a piece of real estate.14 Secondary rights, in contrast, specify the legal 
consequence of violating a primary right or failing to comply with a prima-
ry obligation. For example, one might claim that when one violates the pri-
mary duty of care imposed by the law of negligence and harms another, a 
secondary duty to pay compensation to one’s victim arises. Likewise, one 
might argue that upon breaching a contract to build a house a secondary 
duty to pay damages arises.15 
Austin’s framework lends itself to formulating a duty-based theory of 
civil liability. On this view, civil liability consists of the secondary duties 
that arise upon the breach of the primary duties associated with particular 
substantive bodies of law that do not impose criminal penalties. More 
would be required than this, of course, to fully specify a theory of civil lia-
bility. Austin’s framework, for example, can readily be applied to criminal 
law.16 Hence, we could say that the penal code creates a primary obligation 
to refrain from murder and specifies a secondary rule laying out the pun-
ishment to be inflicted on the murderer.17 For example, one might couple 
Austin’s framework with an understanding of secondary obligations as ob-
ligations of repair or compensation to present a more fully specified theory 
  
 12 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 788-800 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1873) 
(discussing the distinction between primary and secondary rights and duties). 
 13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (setting forth the definition of negli-
gence). 
 14 See generally MARK THOMPSON, LAND LAW 2 (1995) (discussing the incidents of ownership in 
real property). 
 15 Photo Prod. Ltd. v. Securicor Transp. Ltd., [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.) 849 (Lord Diplock) (“Every 
failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of contract. The secondary obligation on the part of 
the contract breaker to which it gives rise by implication of the common law is to pay monetary com-
pensation to the other party for the loss sustained by him in consequence of the breach . . . .”); see also 
Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General Law of Contract, 9 O.J.L.S. 441, 451 
(1989) (describing Lord Diplock’s application of primary and secondary rights to contracts). 
 16 Indeed, Austin himself uses the criminal law in articulating the distinction between primary and 
secondary obligations. See 2 AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 791 (“Under the department of the law which 
relates to secondary rights and duties I include Procedure, civil and criminal.”). 
 17 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (setting forth the definition of 
murder); id. § 210.6 (setting forth the penalty for murder). 
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of civil liability. An expansive version of the corrective justice theories 
offered in torts and contracts might provide examples of such a theory.18 
Another approach to a duty-based theory of civil liability dispenses 
with the Austinian distinction between primary and secondary duties. Ra-
ther we could say that substantive law imposes duties of conduct on legal 
agents and that even when they fail to live up to those duties, the initial 
obligation remains, albeit in an attenuated form.19 For example, one might 
say that even after one breaches a contract, the obligation to perform the 
contract remains.20 Because breach has rendered exact performance impos-
sible, however, the obligation to perform now takes the form of an obliga-
tion to do the next best thing.21 Thus, if I promise to build a house accord-
ing to certain specifications and the house does not comply with the terms 
of the contract, my residual contractual obligation takes the form of an ob-
ligation to pay the difference in value between what was promised and what 
was delivered.22 
This residual obligation approach to civil liability has some advantages 
over its Austinian cousin. By jettisoning the distinction between primary 
and secondary obligations, it no longer requires that we posit some separate 
principle such as corrective justice or a duty of repair to explain the differ-
ence between the secondary rights and obligations of criminal law and civil 
liability. Rather, civil liability can be seen as the residual force of substan-
tive legal obligations, while criminal law concerns itself with the distinct 
question of punishment. Hence, the law of murder deals with the punish-
ment of intentional homicide, while civil liability for wrongful death repre-
sents the residual force of one’s legal obligation not to kill transformed into 
a duty to pay money damages to the surviving victims of one’s homicide.  
Duty, however, is not the only way in which one might conceptualize 
civil liability. 
II. LIABILITY AS COST 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously claimed that the obligation to keep a 
contract means the obligation to perform or the obligation to pay damages 
  
 18 See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is Restitution a Right or 
a Remedy?, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1037, 1053 (2003) (“The general idea underlying the concept of 
corrective justice is that we have a duty to repair or ‘correct’ wrongful losses that we have caused . . . . 
Corrective justice is meant to explain duties to repair (secondary duties) . . . .”). 
 19 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE LAW 
REMEDIES 3 (Charles Rickett ed., 2008) (discussing the role of remedies in the reason conception). 
 20 See Nathan B. Oman, Promise and Private Law, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 943-44 (2012) 
(arguing that remedial obligations in contract law can be seen as the continuation of the initial obligation 
to keep a promise). 
 21 See id. 
 22 See id. 
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in the event of breach, and nothing more.23 This so-called option theory of 
contract is an example of a cost theory of civil liability. On Holmes’s view, 
liability for breach of contract consists of nothing more than what amounts 
to a tax on a particular form of conduct, a cost imposed by the state via lia-
bility.24 As Jeremy Bentham observed, “A fixed penalty is a license in dis-
guise.”25 Nor need a cost theory of liability be confined to contracts. In cor-
respondence with Frederick Pollock, Holmes made clear that he regarded 
liability for tort in the same terms, namely as a cost imposed on a particular 
course of conduct.26 
The most enthusiastic modern disciples of the Holmsian view have 
been the devotees of the law and economics movement. This approach to 
liability ultimately traces its roots to the English economist Arthur Cecil 
Pigou, who identified taxation as a solution to the problem of negative ex-
ternalities.27 When agents can reap the benefits of certain actions while 
throwing the costs onto others, they will engage in more of the activity than 
is socially optimal.28 The solution, argued Pigou, was to align personal in-
centives with social incentives by imposing on the agent a tax equal to the 
externalized cost of his conduct.29 
Law and economics scholars deepened Pigou’s insight by introducing 
the idea of legal entitlements to the model. Ronald Coase noted that in a 
  
 23 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and 
nothing else.”); see also O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881) 
(“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay 
damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference 
until the time for fulfillment [sic] has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Effi-
ciency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where 
the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he 
would have occupied had performance been rendered. Failure to honor an agreement under these cir-
cumstances is a movement toward Pareto optimality . . . .”).  
 25 JEREMY BENTHAM, Last Epigrams and Sayings, in A BENTHAM READER 359, 363 (Mary Peter 
Mack ed., 1969). 
 26 Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Dec. 11, 1928), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 233 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961) (“I don’t think a man promis-
es to pay damages in contract any more than in tort. He commits an act that makes him liable for them if 
a certain event does not come to pass, just as his act in tort makes him liable simpliciter.”). 
 27 See generally Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003, 
in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) (dis-
cussing the intellectual origins of modern law and economics scholarship). 
 28 A symmetrical but opposite problem arises when agents generate goods whose benefits they do 
not fully capture. In this case, the externality causes less production of the good than is socially optimal. 
 29 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (Transaction Publishers 2002) 
(1952) (“It is, however, possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the divergence in any field by 
‘extraordinary encouragements’ or ‘extraordinary restraints’ upon investments in that field. The most 
obvious forms which these encouragements and restraints may assume are, of course, those of bounties 
and taxes.”). 
388 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 21:2 
world where agents can costlessly bargain with one another, Pigouvian in-
efficiencies should not arise because those who bear the costs of an agent’s 
conduct should be willing to pay him not to engage in the conduct so long 
as its marginal costs to them is greater than its marginal benefit to the 
agent.30 Alternatively, if we simply give the victims of the agent’s conduct 
the right to stop him, then the agent should purchase the right to act from 
the right holder, provided again that his marginal benefit exceeds the mar-
ginal costs to his victims.31 In either case one can reach an efficient out-
come without Pigouvian taxation. This result depends, however, on the 
assumption that everyone is informed and rational and—crucially—faces 
no transaction costs.32 In the real world, of course, transaction costs are 
ubiquitous.33 Accordingly, legal entitlements will only produce efficient 
outcomes if they are allocated properly, namely in the manner they would 
be allocated by a market with zero transaction costs.34 
Coase’s insight was expanded by Professor Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed, who argued that any legal entitlement can be protected 
by either a “property rule” or a “liability rule.”35 A property rule allows 
only a voluntary transfer of a legal right.36 A liability rule allows a non-
consensual transfer of a legal right provided that compensation is paid 
ex ante.37 According to Calebresi and Melamed, when transaction costs are 
  
 30 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1960) (arguing that agents 
can bargain to optional outcomes without liability); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW § 1.1 (8th ed. 2011) (“The [Coase Theorem], slightly oversimplified, . . . is that if transactions 
are costless, the initial assignment of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the property.”). 
 31 See Coase, supra note 30, at 2-6 (introducing and analyzing a hypothetical example of this 
phenomenon). 
 32 POSNER, supra at 30, § 3.6. 
 33 One study concluded that roughly 40 percent of the U.S. private economy could be classified as 
transaction costs. See John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in 
the American Economy, 1870-1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95, 
97, 121 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1986). 
 34 POSNER, supra 30, § 3.6 (“It does not follow, however, that the initial assignment of rights is 
immaterial from an efficiency standpoint. Since transactions are never costless in the real world, effi-
ciency is promoted by assigning the legal right to the party who would buy it . . . if it were assigned 
initially to the other party.”). 
 35 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“An entitlement is protected by a 
property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy 
it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the sell-
er. . . . Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively 
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”). Note, Calabresi and Melamed 
use the term “liability” in a very specific sense to refer to money damages as a remedy. This is obvious-
ly different than the more general way in which I am using the term “civil liability” in this Article. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See id. 
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low the property rule will induce bargaining to an efficient outcome.38 
When transaction costs are high, the law should adopt a liability rule.39 This 
will allow the entitlement to flow to the party willing to pay the most for it 
via court judgment and therefore presumably the party with the highest 
marginal utility from the right.40 Again the result is an efficient allocation of 
resources. In effect, liability substitutes a government-set price in situations 
where high transaction costs prevent the emergence of market prices. 
With this background, it is possible to see how the cost theory of civil 
liability differs from a duty theory of civil liability. A duty theory rests cru-
cially on the idea of legal normativity. One ought, at least in a legal sense, 
to comply with the obligations of the substantive law, and civil liability is a 
response to the failure of an agent to comply with that obligation.41 Fur-
thermore, the response itself takes the form of some further duty. Under a 
cost theory of civil liability, in contrast, there is nothing wrongful in any 
sense in violating someone’s legal entitlement.42 The only concern is that 
the price of doing so be properly calibrated through property and liability 
rules. Civil liability, on this view, expresses no normative demands on 
one’s behavior. Its sole purpose is to impose costs on certain kinds of con-
duct, costs that we encourage agents to weigh against the benefits of the 
conduct. In Razian terms, in a cost theory of civil liability, liability does not 
offer an exclusive reason to refrain from a course of conduct.43 
  
 38 See id. at 1127 (“It should be emphasized, however, that where transaction costs do not bar 
negotiations between [parties], or where we are sufficiently certain who the cheapest cost avoider is, 
there are no efficiency reasons for allowing intentional takings, and property rules, supported by injunc-
tions or criminal sanctions, are appropriate.”). 
 39 See id. at 1106 (“Often the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation 
is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will 
not occur. If a collective determination of the value were available instead, the beneficial transfer would 
quickly come about.”). 
 40 See id. at 1106, 1110. 
 41 H.L.A. Hart captured this difference when he distinguished between being “obliged to” do 
something and having “an obligation” to do something. HART, supra note 1, at 80 (“[The assertion that 
someone is obliged to do something] is often a statement about the beliefs and motives with which an 
action is done . . . .”); id. at 81 (“[T]he statement that a person had an obligation . . . remains true even if 
he believed (reasonably or unreasonably) that he would never be found out and had nothing to fear from 
disobedience.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23-24 (1989) 
(“For those who believe in the parties’ freedom to determine their rights, efficient breach means that the 
promisee’s contractual right may be appropriated without his consent if that which was promised to him 
can be used in a way that would yield profits exceeding his loss.”). 
 43 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-19 (1979) (discussing legal authority as a kind of 
exclusive reason). 
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III. LIABILITY AS VULNERABILITY 
Both the duty theory and the cost theory suffer from the same difficul-
ty. Both theories assume that civil liability consists of some kind of en-
forcement by the state. For the duty theory, civil liability consists of the 
state forcing the defendant to comply with some secondary duty of repair or 
the like. Alternatively, the state forces compliance with the residual duties 
left in the wake of breached substantive obligations. Likewise, the cost the-
ory sees civil liability in terms of enforcement. It differs from duty theories 
in its view of how civil liability offers reasons for action. The duty theory 
suggests that one should comply with the primary and remedial obligations 
of private law precisely because they are obligations. They offer normative 
reasons, even moral reasons if one has an obligation to follow the law or if 
the duties instantiated in private law have independent moral force. The 
cost theory, in contrast, offers a reason for action only in the sense that the 
tax imposed on a particular course of conduct by the law should figure in 
one’s all-things-considered calculations of personal utility. If one agrees to 
pay the tax, then there is no reason not to act. Civil liability is simply the 
state coercing payment of the tax. 
This emphasis on law as a mechanism of state enforcement sits com-
fortably within most liberal narratives about the proper role of the law. Lib-
eralism begins with an appreciation for the coercive capacity of the state 
and the need to confine it to its proper sphere. There is, of course a lively 
intra-liberal debate about what the proper role should be. Classical liberals 
and libertarians insist that the reach of the state must be sharply limited.44 
Modern egalitarians, so-called “high liberals,” insist on the need for the 
state to act to ensure just distributive outcomes.45 Both schools of thought, 
however, focus their attention on the agency of the state and view law as an 
instrument of that agency. Hence, the focus of the duty and the cost theories 
is on what the state does to those that are civilly liable. Asking a simple 
question reveals the problem with this approach: if I breach a contract, 
commit a tort, or do some other private wrong, what would the state do to 
me? Upon a moment’s reflection, the answer is “Nothing at all.”46 No legal 
  
 44 See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 1-2, 4-6, 285-87 (1960); ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at ix, xi (1974). 
 45 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-5, 83-89 (1971). The phrase “high liberals” 
was coined in an article by Samuel Freeman, who defined “high liberalism” as meaning “the set of 
institutions and ideas associated with philosophical liberalism, which I take to be the high liberal tradi-
tion. Its major philosophical advocates in each century from the eighteenth to the present are [Immanu-
el] Kant, [John Stuart] Mill, and [John] Rawls.” Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertari-
an Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 106 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
 46 See Oman, supra note 3, at 161 (“There is no duty to pay damages in a tort or contract suit. This 
claim may seem odd to many, but it accords quite well with our current law. Rather than imposing such 
a duty, the common law empowers the plaintiff to act against a liable defendant, extracting wealth from 
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authority would step in to impose a Pigouvian tax on my behavior. Like-
wise there is nothing that guarantees or even requires that I comply with 
some duty of repair or the residual obligations of the duty of care. Rather, 
nothing happens unless the plaintiff chooses to act. A plaintiff must bring 
suit, and upon a declaration that the defendant is liable the plaintiff is given 
control of the remedial machinery that acts against the defendant. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff controls whether a writ of fieri facias issues to the sher-
iff instructing him to seize the defendant’s property. The same is true to a 
certain extent with the criminal law. Nothing happens unless a prosecutor 
chooses to act. The difference is that—at least in theory—the prosecutor 
acts as an agent of the public, albeit one who exercises enormous discre-
tion.47 He or she has a duty to “take Care that that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”48 A civil plaintiff has no such duty. Rather, he or she owns his or 
her claims, which are treated as a piece of personal property.49 Public offi-
cials, in contrast, who treat the powers conferred by their offices as personal 
property have generally committed a crime (such as accepting bribes when 
they try to sell that power). 
The plaintiff’s power over the civil claim is problematic for both duty 
and cost theories. For a duty approach, the problem is that the law does not 
even in theory enforce the duties in question.50 A civil plaintiff is not like a 
public prosecutor exercising discretion over how best to advance the aims 
of the law.51 Rather, the plaintiff acts as a principal. Indeed our ordinary 
moral discourse around litigation recognizes this fact. There are times when 
we recognize that the decision not to sue is praiseworthy and the decision to 
  
him if the plaintiff wishes. This structure is more consistent with civil recourse theory than the demands 
of corrective justice.”). 
 47 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the repre-
sentative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by 
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Jus-
tice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 634 (1999) (“The prosecutor, as a representative of the state, must 
serve this objective and ‘do justice.’”). 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 49 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent Do-
main, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 374 & n.3 (2009). 
 50 See generally Oman, supra note 3, at 137-38, 142. 
 51 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1703 (2010) (“Prosecution offices must make administrative 
choices about how to allocate finite resources. And, generally speaking, prosecutors make administra-
tive choices pursuant either to broad policy objectives or to contextualized discretion (or some mix of 
the two).”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors 
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 57 (1991) (“The prosecutor is simultaneously responsible for the 
community’s protection, victims’ desire for vengeance, defendants’ entitlement to a fair opportunity for 
vindication, and the state’s need for a criminal justice system that is efficient and appears fair. Described 
accurately, the prosecutor represents ‘constituencies’—and several of them at one time.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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sue is blameworthy.52 In such cases, the problem with litigation is not that 
pressing the case would be an unwise use of discretion over enforcement. 
Rather, we recognize that in some cases asserting one’s rights may be cap-
tious, belligerent, or bullying.53 In such cases, we would not castigate the 
victim who declines to sue for neglecting the enforcement of the law even 
when such an act of forgiveness and forbearance by a public prosecutor 
would be inappropriate.54 
A cost approach faces a similar objection. Such theories tend to as-
sume that imposing liability always imposes a cost. Yet in many cases lia-
bility gives rise to no out-of-pocket cost because no suit is brought. Of 
course, one might meet this objection by expanding one’s definition of 
costs to include the risk of out-of-pocket expenses.55 Most of the articulated 
economic theories of civil liability, however, fail to do this. Instead, they 
tend implicitly or explicitly to adopt the simplifying assumption that liabil-
ity results in payment. The real problem, however, is not that one cannot 
adapt a cost theory to the plaintiff-centered system of civil liability. Rather, 
the problem is that such accommodations are post hoc. As a matter of eco-
nomic first principles there is no good reason for confining power over en-
forcement to victims.56 Rather, it makes more sense to give enforcement 
  
 52 See, e.g., Editorial, Medical Malpractice Reforms: One Rx for Oregon, OREGONIAN (last updat-
ed July 29, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/07/medical_
malpractice_reforms_on.html (supporting a state health care reform proposal favoring mediation over 
litigation in disputes between physicians and patients); Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Op-Ed., The 
Alternative to Shareholder Class Actions, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702303816504577312373860495762.html (promoting arbitration over litigation 
in disputes between investors and management). 
 53 See Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 32 (2011) (“Suing 
someone is an aggressive act. Friends almost by definition do not sue each other. Family members only 
sue one another when the bonds of affection have been torn asunder by contention, rivalry, and wrong-
doing. When a victim tells a tortfeasor, ‘I am going to sue you!’ . . . he is threatening to strike back at 
the person who hurt him.”). 
 54 The architect of the Model Penal Code, for example, argued that criminal prosecutors should 
not be in the business of dispensing forgiveness for crimes. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a 
Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1952) (“A society that holds, as we do, to belief in 
law cannot regard with unconcern the fact that prosecuting agencies can exercise so large an influence 
on dispositions that involve the penal sanction, without reference to any norms but those that they may 
create for themselves.”). 
 55 Cf. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 263-64 (1974) (arguing that legal risk created by uncertain laws imposes economic costs on 
society).  
 56 See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damag-
es, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 858-59 (2007) [hereinafter Oman, Contract Damages] (“[T]he plain-
tiff would recoup only an amount sufficient to encourage the optimal level of lawsuits, which is presum-
ably the level at which the marginal social cost of litigation (including the cost of inefficient reliance) is 
exactly equal to the marginal social benefit from more efficient incentives for the breach of contract.”); 
see also Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 529, 562 (2011) [hereinafter Oman, Consent to Retaliation] (“Under efficiency theories, 
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power—and an incentive to use that power—to anyone with information 
about the defendant’s conduct, whether that person is a public prosecutor or 
a private whistleblower. The law, however, generally confines private rights 
of action to victims. Thus, there just doesn’t seem to be any discernible 
point, from a cost perspective, to what seems to be a key feature of civil 
liability. 
The word “liable” points toward a better theory of civil liability. The 
root of the word lies in the Medieval Latin term ligabilis, meaning to be 
bound or tied.57 The original idea seems to have been that one who was 
bound was exposed to whatever might be done to him. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the term “in older use with wider sense” meant, 
“[e]xposed or subject to, or likely to suffer from (something prejudicial).”58 
Thus, for example, in Paradise Lost, Milton speaks of how the defeated 
Satanic hosts recoiled when they were “first with fear surprised and sense 
of pain” because before their defeat they were “[n]ot liable to fear or flight 
or pain.”59 They are contrasted in the following lines with the “inviolable 
saints . . . [i]nvulnerable, impenetrably armed.”60 If one is not liable, one 
was invulnerable. If one is liable, however, to fear or flight or pain, then 
one is vulnerable to those things. Notice, that the core meaning of the term 
is exposure and vulnerability. The pain suffered by the fallen hosts of heav-
en is not a duty that they owe or a tax that they are required to pay. Rather, 
it is the unexpected exposure resulting from a defeat in battle. 
Likewise, civil liability is best thought of in terms of vulnerability. To 
be liable means that one is exposed to attack in a way that one was not pre-
viously exposed. The property and liberty of a defendant who has been 
found not liable for some civil wrong remains protected from any further 
action by the plaintiff. Once a defendant is found liable, however, this 
changes. Now the plaintiff has the power to call upon the coercive appa-
ratus of the state to do things to the defendant. In the absence of civil liabil-
ity, this machinery lies inert. It is unlawful for a private party to employ it 
against an opponent. In many cases it is even unlawful for the state to em-
ploy the machinery against the defendant. Once the defendant is found lia-
ble, however, this changes. Now he is exposed. As he is no longer 
“[i]nvulnerable, impenetrably armed”61 by the protection of the state, the 
very coercive apparatus that protected him is now put at the disposal of the 
  
plaintiffs are enlisted to incentivize optimal performance, while under moral theories, plaintiffs serve as 
enforcers of the obligation to perform one’s promises. This pragmatic argument, however, cannot ex-
plain the odd fact that only the promisee (or a third-party beneficiary) may bring an action for breach of 
contract.” (footnote omitted)). 
 57 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 878 (2d ed. 1989) (stating the etymology of “liable”). 
 58 Id. Within the list of definitions for “liable,” this particular definition can be found at “3. a.” Id.  
 59 See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. 6, ll. 391-397 (Gordon Teskey ed., W W Norton & Co. 
2005) (1674). 
 60 See id. ll. 397-400. 
 61 Id. l. 400. 
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plaintiff to use or not as he or she sees fit. To be sure, there are limits on the 
vulnerability of the liable defendant. Only certain remedies are put at the 
disposal of the plaintiff. What defines the legal status of civil liability, how-
ever, is precisely this precarious position of exposure to private attack by 
the plaintiff.62 
One might object that the diversity of remedies available in response 
to civil liability belies the claim that it can be unified under the rubric of 
vulnerability. Consider the remedy of specific performance for breach of 
contract. This seems to be an order requiring that one perform one’s con-
tractual obligations. Likewise, money damages in response for an action on 
a liquidated debt also seems to be a species of duty enforcement. Punitive 
damages might plausibly be seen as a species of personal retribution for 
egregious conduct, but compensatory damages for economic losses seem 
rather more like a form of cost shifting or insurance. Replevin seems to be a 
matter of requiring the return of property to its lawful owner, while money 
damages for conversion seems to be a species of forced sale. And so on. In 
all of these cases it would seem that what we are witnessing is not a kind of 
vulnerability to attack, but rather an effort by the state to coerce some de-
sired state of affairs into being. In short: enforcement. 
It is important to realize, however, that civil liability is not the same 
thing as the law of remedies. A finding that the defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff doesn’t necessarily mean that any particular remedy will be availa-
ble. Consider again the remedy of specific performance. In some cases a 
finding that Able is liable to Beth for breach of contract will give to Beth 
the right to demand specific performance of the contract.63 In other cases—
as, for example, when the contract involves a promise on the part of Able to 
provide personal services—specific performance will not be available.64 
Likewise, in some cases a court might find liability but be unable to award 
  
 62 The power that plaintiffs gain over liable defendants is practical rather than normative. My 
claim is not that the plaintiffs in bringing suit are exercising a normative power to impose new duties or 
obligations on defendants. Rather, I am claiming that once a court declares a defendant to be liable the 
plaintiff has the power to require that government officials seize the defendant’s property and the like. 
The plaintiff also has the power to forbear from any further action against the defendant. Indeed, else-
where I have argued that process of litigation imposes no duties on even defeated defendants to pay 
damages, duties that also do not exist upon commission of a legal wrong. See generally Oman, supra 
note 3, at 152-53. Of course, the reality of judgment-proof defendants and the cost of invoking the 
machinery of the state means that the practical power that plaintiffs acquire over defendants may be very 
limited, but my claim has never been that the vulnerability of liable defendants was massive or unlim-
ited. Indeed, I think that the persistent invulnerability these problems create for certain classes of de-
fendants is a powerful criticism of our current system of civil justice. I do not, however, believe that 
these normative criticisms are objections to the conceptual claim I am making in this Article. I am 
grateful to comments by Professor Joseph Raz at King’s College London and private exchanges with 
Professors Ori Herstein and Benjamin Zipursky for sharpening my thinking on this point. 
 63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981) (setting forth a general rule regard-
ing the availability of specific performance). 
 64 Id. § 367 (noting that specific performance is unavailable in personal service contracts). 
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compensatory damages—for example, in a case for breach of contract 
where the damages cannot be calculated with certainty.65 To say that civil 
liability consists of vulnerability to attack by the plaintiff is to make a claim 
about the meaning of liability, not the meaning of particular remedies.  
Civil liability is a form of vulnerability because a judgment of liability 
means that a defendant is exposed in a way that he was not before. It may 
be unclear exactly to what he is exposed. Damages? Injunctions? Some-
thing else? There are, however, two elements present in all cases of civil 
liability. First, the person who is liable is subject to demands that the person 
who is not liable does not face. If a court declares that someone is in breach 
of contract, then his liberty and property are exposed in a way that they 
were not previously exposed. He may be required on pain of imprisonment 
to perform some act. His property may be subject to seizure in payment of 
some debt. In the absence of liability, however, laws against kidnapping 
and extortion would protect him from the kind of pressure that can be 
brought against his liberty once deemed liable. Likewise, laws against theft 
would protect his property from the kind of seizure to which it would be 
potentially exposed after a judgment of liability. Second, civil liability does 
not make a person generally vulnerable. Rather, it makes him vulnerable to 
a particular person, namely the plaintiff. At any point after the declaration 
of liability, the plaintiff can choose to exercise whatever powers the law 
gives her over the defendant or can choose to forbear.66 A finding of liabil-
ity may give rise to a claim for money damages, but if the plaintiff declines 
to swear out a writ of fieri facias against the defendant’s property, nothing 
happens.  
In short, civil liability consists of neither the substantive rules that give 
rise to its existence nor the remedial rules that specify the powers that it 
confers upon victorious plaintiffs. Rather, civil liability is the state of vul-
nerability that stands between substance and remedy. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF INVULNERABILITY 
Political philosophers often mark the beginning of modern political 
thought with the publication of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan in 1651. 
Hobbes was not, of course, a liberal. His Leviathan is a famously uncon-
strained and authoritarian sovereign.67 Nevertheless, Hobbes did much to 
  
 65 Id. § 352 (providing that damages must be calculated with certainty in order to be recovered). 
 66 The plaintiff’s power, of course, does not last indefinitely. There are—albeit very long—
statutes of limitations on judgments. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R § 211(b) (MCKINNEY 2003); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-251(A) (Supp. 2013). Doctrines such as laches may further limit the time of exposure. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630, 953 (9th ed. 2009). 
 67 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 128 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (1651) (“His 
power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another; he cannot forfeit it; he cannot be accused 
by any of his subjects of injury; he cannot be punished by them; he is judge of what is necessary for 
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frame the way in which individuals relate to one another and to the state in 
subsequent political theorizing, especially in the English-speaking world. 
Liberal theorists who followed him offered dramatically different visions of 
the appropriate scope of the state. They shared with Hobbes, however, a 
basic sense of the problem for which the state is a solution. By and large, it 
is a framing of the political problem that remains part of the common sense 
of contemporary political discourse. That problem is the pervasive fact of 
individual vulnerability. 
Hobbes begins with the state of nature. For him, this is a condition of 
unconstrained aggression and ubiquitous vulnerability. The result is not 
pleasant. “Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe,” he wrote, “they are in that condi-
tion which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every 
man.”68 On Hobbes’s view, there is no individual escape from the state of 
war. No one person is so overwhelmingly strong or clever to long dominate 
his fellows unaided.69 Accordingly, without some exit from the state of na-
ture, mankind is doomed to an existence that is, in the famous phrase, “soli-
tary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”70 Hobbes’s solution is Leviathan, a 
collective person formed by an initial social contract and endowed with 
overwhelming coercive capacity. The result is a transition from a situation 
of ubiquitous exposure to attack to one in which each individual is essen-
tially invulnerable except to the actions of the sovereign.71 
Subsequent thinkers have traveled far from their Hobbesian origins. 
John Locke offered a rosier vision of the state of nature.72 He agreed with 
Hobbes, however, on the ultimate precariousness of life without the state 
and the need for centralized coercion to solve the problem of vulnerabil-
ity.73 Locke, and the liberal tradition that followed him, of course lacked 
  
peace, and judge of doctrines; he is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies, and of the times 
and occasions of war and peace; to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, 
and all other officers and ministers, and to determine of rewards and punishments, honour and order.”). 
 68 Id. at 76. 
 69 Id. at 74 (“Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind . . . yet when all is 
reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can 
thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the 
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or 
by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.”). 
 70 Id. at 76. 
 71 Id. at 219 (“The office of the sovereign . . . consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with 
the sovereign power, namely, the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the 
law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him. But 
by safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man 
by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.”). 
 72 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 16-18 (Lester DeKoster ed., 
William B. Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1978) (1690). 
 73 See id. at 20. 
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Hobbes’s sanguine attitude toward unlimited state power.74 They agreed, 
however, that it was legitimate for the state to act in order to eliminate the 
vulnerability of its citizens to private aggression.75 Indeed, the legitimacy of 
the state is grounded in large part on the elimination of such vulnerability. 
The elimination of vulnerability continues to be a dominant concern in 
contemporary political thought. For example, one can think of the high lib-
eral tradition, with its seeds in the mid-nineteenth-century writings of John 
Stuart Mill and its most comprehensive modern statement in the work of 
John Rawls, as a response to vulnerability.76 Rather than focusing on the 
negative liberties protecting one from vulnerability before the state, howev-
er, the high liberal tradition focuses on the state’s duty to protect citizens 
from the accidents of disadvantaged birth or the adverse fortunes of the 
marketplace.77 Notice, however, that even in these most recent formulations 
of liberal theory, the legitimacy of the state is tied to the elimination of vul-
nerability. 
Civil liability thus represents something of a puzzle. If the purpose of 
civil liability is to compel defendants to perform their duties or pay the effi-
cient price for their actions, then civil liability fits smoothly into the vision 
of law as an instrument of the state for eliminating vulnerability and misbe-
havior. On the other hand, if civil liability is about creating vulnerability to 
private attack, then it seems at odds with the liberal tradition. From the state 
of nature that so concerned Hobbes and Locke to the jaundiced view of the 
unregulated market that dominates the thought of modern egalitarians like 
Rawls, the purpose of the law is to limit the vulnerability of individuals. 
Why, then, should so much of the law be devoted to the creation of vulner-
ability?  
The puzzle of vulnerability is heightened when one considers the form 
that the vulnerability of civil liability takes. Classical liberals and libertari-
ans, for example, are willing to tolerate far more economic vulnerability 
than are high liberals, who believe that the state should create a generous 
system of social benefits to buffer the individual against the effects of bad 
  
 74 Compare id. at 20-21 (outlining Locke’s view that individuals consented to participate in cen-
tralized government by transferring some of their rights to a state power while retaining others), with 
HOBBES, supra note 67, at 128. 
 75 See LOCKE, supra note 72, at 20. 
 76 See JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS 27-56 (2012) (providing a brief intellectual history 
of the roots of high liberalism). 
 77 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 190, 191 
(2003) (“[P]eople [should] be made equal, so far as this is possible, in their opportunity to insure or 
provide against bad luck before it has occurred, or, if that is not possible, [they should] be awarded the 
compensation it is likely they would have insured to have if they had had that opportunity.”); see gener-
ally Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last updated Mar. 5, 
2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ (discussing the distinction between 
negative and positive liberties). 
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fortune or bad decisions.78 Libertarian and classical liberal toleration for 
vulnerability, however, does not flow from the fact that such vulnerability 
is seen as a goal. Rather, the vulnerability of individuals to the vagaries of 
the market, for example, is seen as a necessary (if perhaps regrettable) re-
sult of a proper respect for individual rights. Alternatively, one might sup-
port a dynamic and largely unregulated market not because it leaves some 
people vulnerable, but because such a market is seen, in the aggregate, as 
providing greater social welfare or greater opportunities for upward social 
mobility.79 Again, the vulnerability is an unfortunate side effect rather than 
a goal. The nature of this vulnerability also differs from that created by civil 
liability. It is not the vulnerability of persons to particular other persons. 
Rather, it is the toleration of a social system that leaves people vulnerable to 
what are conceptualized as essentially random accidents. This is true even if 
the vulnerability is justified by some notion of personal responsibility.80 
Hence, for example, one might believe that one should leave the lazy or the 
shiftless to the economic consequences of their decisions, precisely because 
they are lazy and shiftless—in other words, because the vulnerability is 
deserved. Even this kind of vulnerability, however, is not vulnerability to 
any particular person. 
If the main tradition of liberal theory sees law primarily as a response 
to a condition of vulnerability in the absence of the state, we can think of 
civil liability as a response to the problem of invulnerability created by the 
state. State of nature theories have been so deeply ingrained into our think-
ing that the assumption that vulnerability is an evil seems self-evident. Vul-
nerability, however, has its uses. To see the problem of invulnerability, 
consider the example of thermonuclear war.81 During the dark days of the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies created 
massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons.82 Initially, the Americans enjoyed a 
monopoly on The Bomb, one that gave the United States the ability to at-
tack the Soviet Union with devastating force while leaving itself relatively 
  
 78 See generally NOZICK, supra note 44 (defending markets as a mechanism for human liberty). 
 79 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) 
(1962) (defending markets as a mechanism for social mobility). 
 80 See generally HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (D. Appleton & Co. 1873) (1851) (defend-
ing what became known as “Social Darwinism”). 
 81 See, e.g., HENRY A. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 84-85 (1957) 
(“[W]e are vulnerable to a direct hostile attack. . . . But perhaps our dangers offer us at the same time a 
way out of our dilemmas. As long as the consequences of all-out thermonuclear war appear as stark to 
the other side as to us, they may avert disaster, not through a reconciliation of interests but through 
mutual terror.”). 
 82 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GORDIN, RED CLOUD AT DAWN 288 (2009) (“[I]n early 1953, the United 
States had already built 832 nuclear weapons. Within a year, that number had risen to 1,161; in two 
years, to 1,630; and in three years, to 2,280.”); see also id. at 300 (“By the end of the 1950s, there were 
three nuclear powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom), all armed with 
both fission and thermonuclear weapons.”). 
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invulnerable to Soviet retaliation.83 From the point of view of Russian strat-
egists, this was a deeply dangerous situation. They insisted that only if the 
United States could be made vulnerable to a nuclear counterstrike would 
the U.S.S.R. be safe.84  
Once both sides were armed with nuclear weapons, however, a new 
problem presented itself. What if one side engaged in a preemptive first 
strike, using its nuclear weapons to destroy the retaliatory capability of the 
other side? Strategists on both sides of the Iron Curtain responded by in-
creasing their arsenals, creating so many nuclear weapons that even the 
most devastating first strike couldn’t guarantee that there would be no re-
sponse. As the range and accuracy of first bombers and then ballistic mis-
siles increased, the antagonists turned to submarines.85 The idea was to have 
nuclear missiles under the sea where they could never be hit in a first strike, 
thus guaranteeing a counterstrike in any scenario. This then led to increas-
ingly sophisticated submarines to hunt the missile submarines.86 And so on, 
with ever more destructive technologies being devised to counter the last 
round of murderous innovations. 
At the time, the logic of the nuclear arms race seemed utterly absurd to 
many.87 Nations were sinking billions of dollars into expensive weapons in 
pursuit of the goal of mutually assured destruction.88 Safety could only ex-
  
 83 See id. at 300 (“All the proliferators after 1945 had to face a world in which the United States 
already possessed these weapons—and . . . had already used them twice.”); id. at 28 (“The atomic mo-
nopoly—the control of this new weapon by the United States alone—contributed heavily to the empha-
sis on nuclear weapons for deterring the Soviet Union, and also to the sense of American exceptionalism 
that fueled the ideological fires of the cold war.”). 
 84 See id. at 142-43 (quoting several Soviet nuclear physicists to reflect “the Soviets’ perception 
that they needed a nuclear bomb to deter an immediate attack by the atomic jingoists in Washington”). 
 85 See Byard Q. Clemmons, Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles: An Arms Control Proposal, 38 
NAVAL L. REV. 195, 196 (1989) (“During the 1950’s the United States developed a variety of long-
range nuclear cruise missiles . . . .”); id. at 197 (“The Soviet Union . . . has included [sea-launched cruise 
missiles] as part of its operational Navy since the late 1950’s.”). 
 86 For an example of the American military’s stance on antisubmarine technology, see John P. 
Craven, The Challenge of Ocean Technology to the Law of the Sea, 22 JAG J. 31, 33 (1967) (“The 
symmetric problem of protection of the United States against ballistic missile submarines of a potential-
ly hostile power is consequently of the utmost technical difficulty for the antisubmarine warfare systems 
designer. . . . Fortunately, there is a marked asymmetry in the geopolitical/geologistic ability of present-
ly identifiable, potentially hostile powers, which gives hope that the United States will be able to main-
tain the invulnerability of its strategic submersibles and, at the same time, be able to detect and counter 
any submarine threat . . . .”). 
 87 See, e.g., DR. STRANGELOVE, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB 
(Columbia Pictures 1964) (a dark comedy, directed by Stanley Kubrick and starring Peter Sellers, sug-
gesting that the nuclear arms race was utterly absurd). 
 88 See, e.g., GORDIN, supra note 82, at 270 (detailing the impact of the Soviet Union’s first nuclear 
weapons test on proposed military funding under the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act: the Senate 
had proposed to reduce initial proposed allocations by 40 percent, but after the Senate became aware of 
the Soviet test, the proposed reductions were dropped and funding increased to 30 percent over the 
initial proposal). 
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ist, according to the nuclear war mavens, in a world in which everyone was 
maximally vulnerable to attack from everyone else. This logic reached its 
apotheosis in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, in which both sides of 
the Cold War pledged not to construct weapons designed to protect them-
selves from nuclear attack.89 In other words, both superpowers promised to 
remain vulnerable to nuclear attack.  
Despite the ghastly logic of nuclear deterrence, in the end it proved 
remarkably effective. There were two generations of international tension, 
but there was no massive World War III between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. Soviet tanks never poured across the plains of the German Federal 
Republic, and American missiles never rained down Armageddon on Rus-
sian cities.90 With each round in the Cold War’s nuclear chess game, the 
antagonists created systems that ensured the vulnerability of the other. This 
vulnerability, in turn, had the ironic effect of reducing aggression and con-
flict. To be sure, the Cold War saw vicious proxy wars, but the logic of 
mutually assured destruction prevented the kind of superpower conflict that 
most haunted the nightmares of the post-war generations.91 What is striking 
about this story is that the threat to peace during this period was less the 
Hobbesian war of all against all than the specter of an invulnerable power 
attacking its vulnerable foe. The solution was to create vulnerability to at-
tack. 
Contract law provides a more prosaic example of the same logic. One 
of the basic problems of contracting over time is the danger of ex post op-
portunism.92 When quid is exchanged simultaneously for quo, neither party 
is particularly exposed. On the other hand, if one party confers a benefit on 
the other party now in the expectation of a future benefit, the counterparty 
always faces the temptation to take the money and run. This temptation is 
particularly strong when the disappointed promisee has no means of retali-
ating against the breaching promisor. Seen in these terms, ex post opportun-
ism is really a problem of invulnerability. Not surprisingly, in situations 
  
 89 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. V, ¶ 1, May 26, 
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 (“Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or compo-
nents which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”) (entered into force Oct. 3, 
1972, unilaterally withdrawn from force June 13, 2002). 
 90 Compare generally TOM CLANCY, RED STORM RISING (1986) (providing a fictionalized ac-
count of a World War III with conventional weapons in northern Europe, which teeters on the brink of 
becoming nuclear), with JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY (2005) (recounting the 
tense—but World War III-free!—years of the Cold War and the final collapse of the Soviet Union). 
 91 See generally GADDIS, supra note 90 (discussing proxy wars between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. in Africa, Asia, and Latin America). 
 92 See Oman, Consent to Retaliation, supra note 56, at 533 (discussing the problem of ex post 
opportunism). 
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where a promisor is vulnerable to retaliation, cooperative outcomes general-
ly prevail.93 
Over the last few centuries, modern states have gradually increased 
their coercive capacity. As governments have acquired the administrative 
and technological tools to more effectively monitor and coerce their citi-
zens, they have become increasingly effective at suppressing most forms of 
private aggression against liberty and property. The citizen of a modern 
state who chooses to take his neighbor’s property or hold him hostage until 
he agrees to some demand will in all likelihood face criminal trial and in-
carceration. The result is that modern citizens are increasingly exposed to 
aggression by the state but are largely invulnerable to private aggression. 
To be sure, crime continues to exist and, in some communities, modern 
states tolerate shocking levels of interpersonal violence.94 Such enclaves, 
however, are exceptional, and we view them as areas where the state has 
failed to fulfill its duties. Most of us assume that come what may our 
neighbors simply lack the ability to take our property or restrict our liberty 
and get away with it. 
A certain amount of vulnerability in interpersonal relationships, how-
ever, is desirable. It is easier to cooperate with someone who is exposed to 
your displeasure in the event that he misbehaves. To be sure, in theory the 
state could foster such cooperation by simply punishing advantage taking 
and misbehavior such as ex post opportunism in contractual settings. In 
some cases, this is precisely what the state has done. The decision of the 
New Zealand government to abolish tort liability for personal injuries from 
motor vehicle accidents is an example.95 However, we might be uneasy 
further extending the authority of public prosecutors. Imagine a world, for 
example, in which every breach of contract were treated as a petty crime to 
be prosecuted. One might conclude that creating effective enforcement for 
breach of contract would require such a massive expansion in the reach of 
law enforcement as to itself threaten individual liberty. 
This Article, however, does not argue that a system of civil liability is 
required by basic principles of political justice or that it is superior to an 
alternative solution to the problem of invulnerability. Rather, it argues that 
civil liability is one possible solution to this problem. In effect, we foster 
cooperation by “turning off” the invulnerability provided by the modern 
state, allowing private aggression under strictly limited circumstances and 
  
 93 See id. at 542-43 (discussing how cooperation develops when parties may retaliate against bad 
actors). 
 94 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Detroit Tops the 2012 List of America’s Most Dangerous Cities, 
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/18/detroit-tops-
the-2012-list-of-americas-most-dangerous-cities/ (explaining that Detroit is the most dangerous city in 
America, with the rate of violent crime at 2,137 per 100,000 residents). 
 95 See Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 976, 982-83 (1985) (“[A] victim, whether at fault or not, must apply to a government body, the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, for compensation.”). 
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to a strictly limited extent.96 Such limited vulnerability, rather than leading 
to the state of anarchic war that Hobbes associated with the vulnerability of 
the state of nature, can be justified as fostering precisely the kind of peace-
ful cooperation to which a liberal state aspires.97 
The problem of invulnerability takes a second form. Again, consider 
the relative success of the modern state in suppressing aggression. This 
does not mean, of course, that no wrongs are committed. But the number of 
wrongs is sharply limited. More importantly for our purposes, however, the 
ability of an individual to retaliate in the face of such wrongs is sharply 
limited. If you kill my son or daughter, it will be very difficult for me to 
pursue a vendetta against you without attracting the full attention—and 
overwhelming coercive capacity—of the modern state. The person who 
desires to remain law abiding either from prudence or from respect for the 
law is largely deprived of the means for personal retaliation against wrong-
doers. 
Normally, we don’t regard revenge as a laudable response to wrongdo-
ing.98 Hence, it seems odd to claim that the constraints on misbehavior im-
posed by the coercive success of the modern state are a problem. This 
seems especially true where the state creates an apparatus for punishing 
those that wrong others. Hence, the criminal law constrains my ability to 
pursue vengeance against the person who kills my children, but it will also 
step in to punish the murderer. While revenge is not generally celebrated in 
our culture, we do place value on the agency of wronged victims, greater 
agency than is allowed by the impersonal, third-party apparatus of the crim-
inal law. 
Civil liability creates the conditions for such agency on the part of vic-
tims.99 Professors Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg, for example, 
have argued that tort law exists to empower victims to hold those that have 
harmed them responsible for their acts.100 The emphasis is on the agency of 
the plaintiff and the way that tort law empowers him or her. Zipursky has 
grounded the right to civil recourse in Lockean social contract theory, see-
  
 96 See generally Oman, Consent to Retaliation, supra note 56. 
 97 See id. at 544-51 (discussing tit-for-tat strategies of retaliation and the way in which they can 
foster cooperation); see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) 
(same). 
 98 See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (criticizing 
civil recourse theories as exalting the value of vengeance). 
 99 See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1149-54 (2013) (arguing for the importance of victim agency in private law). 
 100 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a 
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1743-44 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718-21 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights]. 
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ing it as a reserve of the primordial right to enforce natural law.101 Others 
have grounded civil recourse in ideas of wronged honor, a peculiar 
“redressive” form of justice, or second-person (as opposed to third-person) 
forms of moral address.102 All of these theories seem to sit most comforta-
bly within tort law—especially within the realms of negligence and inten-
tional torts—with its emphasis on fault and wrongdoing. They all respond, 
however, to a particular kind of problem created by the relative invulnera-
bility of citizens in the modern state. That problem is the essential passivity 
that a wrongdoer’s invulnerability to private attack imposes on victims.103 
Civil liability, in contrast, is both intentionally created and relationally 
structured. The vulnerability of a tortfeasor to a civil action by a tort victim 
is not an accidental or regrettable byproduct of tort law’s pursuit of another 
goal. There is a real sense in which the purpose of tort law is to impose civil 
liability on tortfeasors. This is not to deny that tort law serves various in-
strumental goals for which liability is a tool. While neo-formalists like Pro-
fessor Ernest Weinrib insist that private law has no purpose other than to be 
private law, one need not adopt such a position to accept the claim that civil 
liability is in some sense the goal of tort law.104 The same is true of the civil 
liability created by contract law. Furthermore, the vulnerability created by 
civil liability is not a general vulnerability in the face of broad forces. Ra-
ther, the vulnerability is sharply limited. The tortfeasor is not generally vul-
nerable to attack on the basis of his tortious conduct. Rather, he is vulnera-
ble to attack only by a plaintiff armed with a judgment declaring that the 
tortfeasor is civilly liable. 
In summary, the vulnerability of civil liability is structured so as to al-
low for sharp interpersonal conflict. This conflict is a potential solution to 
at least two problems created by the success of the modern state in sup-
pressing private aggression. The first is the difficulty in fostering coopera-
tion among parties that are relatively invulnerable to retaliation. The second 
is the suppression of the agency of victims in the face of wrongdoing. See-
ing civil liability as a system of vulnerability and looking to the sorts of 
arguments that might justify such a regime also sheds light on how we 
might think about the relationship between different fields of private law, 
such as torts and contracts. 
  
 101 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 98, at 623. 
 102 See Oman, supra note 53, at 34 (offering a defense of recourse theory grounded in the idea of 
vindicating one’s honor); see also Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2011) (offering a “redressive justice” defense of civil recourse); Jason M. 
Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1790 (2009) (defending 
civil recourse as an example of the second-person standpoint in morality). 
 103 See generally Oman & Solomon, supra note 99 (arguing for the importance of victim agency in 
private law). 
 104 Cf. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]he purpose of private law is to be private law.”). 
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V. VULNERABILITY AND PRIVATE LAW THEORY 
Until recently private law theory outside of the realm of law and eco-
nomics scholarship has been fragmented.105 For example, torts scholars 
have pursued explanations of their field based on ideas of corrective jus-
tice.106 With a few exceptions, this work has had little influence on contract 
theorists.107 Rather, these scholars have focused their attention on concepts 
such as consent or promissory morality.108 In this fragmented view of pri-
vate law, differing areas of substantive law pursue essentially unconnected 
aims and respond to independent problems and concerns. The focus on the 
substantive normative basis for tort and contract thus raises the question of 
whether there is any broader unity to private law and, if so, what concepts 
provide this unity. 
There are reasons both to be uncomfortable with an entirely fragment-
ed vision of private law and skeptical of attempts to unify it under any con-
temporary theory. Consider the idea of corrective justice, which has been 
largely responsible for the revival of interest in moral theories of tort law. 
The idea seems to fit well with the system of fault and compensation that 
one finds in tort law and may even be expanded or modified to include 
strict liability torts.109 By focusing on the bilateral relationship between 
plaintiffs and defendants, particularly the way that damages are paid from 
wrongdoers to victims, it provides a compelling criticism of economic theo-
ries of tort law.110 Strikingly, the very features of tort law that motivate the 
corrective justice critique of economic theories are also present in contract 
law.111 Contract law also involves a bilateral relationship between plaintiffs 
  
 105 Law and economics scholarship has never had any difficulty in unifying disparate theories of 
law. Rather, it has confidently argued that all of them can be understood and evaluated using the tools of 
microeconomic theory and the criterion of efficiency. In applying economic theory to a broad range of 
“non-economic” phenomena, this work has been heavily influenced by Professor Gary Becker’s ambi-
tion to unify social sciences under the banner of economic analysis. See generally GARY S. BECKER, 
THE ECONOMIC WAY OF LOOKING AT BEHAVIOR: THE NOBEL LECTURE (1996). 
 106 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS 
AND WRONGS (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS]; WEINRIB, supra note 2; Ernest J. Weinrib, Cor-
rective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992). 
 107 But see Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS 118, 183 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Correc-
tive Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3014 (2007); Oman, Contract Damages, 
supra note 56, at 869-70. 
 108 See generally STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004) (summarizing contemporary 
debates in contract law theory). 
 109 See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 
427 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (1995). 
 110 See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1240-42 (1988) (book 
review). 
 111 Oman, Contract Damages, supra note 56, at 870. 
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and defendants.112 Like tortfeasors, contract breachers pay damages to those 
whose legal rights they have violated.113 It seems natural that contract law 
and tort law are somehow normatively related to one another. 
Closer examination, however, reveals that unifying contract and tort 
under the banner of corrective justice is likely to be difficult. First, the sub-
stantive duties in tort and contract do not obviously relate to one another. 
For example, tort law can be plausibly seen as imposing on agents the duty 
to take reasonable care not to harm the persons and property of another. 
Such a duty has no immediate connection to the legal obligation to perform 
certain voluntary agreements. To be sure, once such contractual duties exist 
one could think of them as the property of obligees which could be inter-
fered with.114 This is more or less what the law does with tortious interfer-
ence with contract.115 Contract law itself, however, does not rely on notions 
of fault, as the tort of negligence does. Rather liability in contract is strict 
and limited to the person obligated under the contract rather than running to 
all the world.116 
Second, the apparent unity of tort and contract seems most intuitive 
when one examines the remedy of money damages. Yet both tort and con-
tract cases can involve remedies other than money damages. For example, 
contract law provides for specific performance, which seems less about 
compensation than simply compelling performance with the underlying 
duty to keep a contract.117 In other cases, the courts will issue negative in-
junctions against conduct that is not forbidden by the contract but is incon-
sistent with its performance.118 In addition, contract cases can give rise to 
remedies, such as replevin or reformation of the contract, that are neither 
money damages nor injunctive.119 In some cases, contracts can give rise to 
  
 112 Id. at 846 (“Any private lawsuit brings together a plaintiff and a defendant.”). 
 113 Id. at 833 (“Generally speaking, the remedy in contract law involves a transfer from a breaching 
party to an aggrieved party.”). 
 114 See generally id. 
 115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). 
 116 There are, of course, strict liability torts that have been defended on corrective justice grounds. 
See generally COLEMAN, RISK, supra note 106 (defending the compatibility of strict liability and correc-
tive justice). Likewise, there is a lively debate as to whether duties in tort law run to all the world or 
whether they are relational, running only to particular right holders. Compare Zipursky, Rights, supra 
note 100, at 55-67 (arguing that tort law has a basically relational structure), with Jane Stapleton, Evalu-
ating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 (2006) (criticizing 
the relational view of tort law). 
 117 See SMITH, supra note 108, at 398-403 (discussing autonomy defenses of the remedy of specific 
performance); see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 708, 722-23 (2007).  
 118 See Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.) 693; 1 De G.M. & G. 604, 618-19. 
 119 See, e.g., 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 70:20 (4th ed. 2003) (“The equitable remedy of reformation will not make a new agree-
ment for the parties but, instead, will establish and perpetuate the true, existing contract by making the 
instrument express the real intent of the parties.”). 
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remedies that do not even involve the intervention of a court, such as the 
right to take possession of personal property under a security agreement120 
or the setoff of debts owed to a breaching party.121 Furthermore, the role 
served by money damages can differ depending on the nature of the claim 
being asserted. Hence, for example, nominal damages are difficult to con-
ceptualize as compensatory, serving more the role of a declaratory judg-
ment.122 A contract action on a liquidated debt is more a matter of enforce-
ment than compensation.123 Once the complexity of contractual remedies is 
acknowledged, it is difficult to argue that compensation is the overriding 
goal of contract law. 
Focusing on the idea of civil liability as the creation of vulnerability, 
however, offers a more promising approach to understanding the relation-
ship between theories of tort and contract. These fields are not united by a 
common set of core substantive doctrinal concepts. For example, the idea of 
reasonable care which lies at the heart of negligence doctrine has no clear 
analogue in contract doctrine, where liability is triggered by breach, regard-
less of fault.124 Nor are tort and contract clearly unified by a common set of 
normative goals. To be sure, there is some overlap, but it seems unlikely 
that tort and contract can be traced in their entirety to some common set of 
normative concerns.125 What unifies these fields is the concept of civil lia-
bility. What they share is the common outcome of a successful suit in the 
fact of civil liability and the fact that the basic structure of civil liability is 
the same across different areas of law. Hence, successful plaintiffs in both 
contract suits and tort suits acquire the ability to do certain things to de-
fendants which were previous forbidden. Civil liability renders both tortfea-
sors and contract breachers vulnerable to attack. 
Rather than asking if there is some common normative concern that 
unites tort and contract, we should ask why each body of law results in civil 
liability. What unites the normative foundations of each field is the fact that 
creating vulnerability can advance their normative goals. For example, this 
Author has argued elsewhere that contract law’s primary normative goal is 
  
 120 See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000) (right to take possession of collateral upon default without judicial 
intervention). 
 121 See U.C.C. § 9-340 (bank’s right to setoff against deposit accounts upon breach). 
 122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981) (discussing awards of nominal 
damages). 
 123 I am indebted to Professor Stephen Smith of McGill University for drawing this argument to 
my attention. 
 124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236 cmt. a (“Every breach gives rise to a claim 
for damages, and may give rise to other remedies.”); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Forward: Fault in 
American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2009) (“Tortfeasors can take measures to 
avoid accidents; contracting parties can take measures to avoid loss from breach.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Oman, supra note 53, at 64-65 (discussing the difficulty of explaining both tort and 
contract law as vindicating wronged honor). 
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the support of healthy markets.126 Markets, in turn, are valuable because 
they provide a host of moral goods, such as mechanisms for social coordi-
nation between otherwise antagonistic people, the inculcation of desirable 
moral habits, and—not least—the creation of wealth. One of the primary 
impediments to the functioning of healthy markets is invulnerability.127 
Merchants and other market participants need to be able to retaliate against 
those that opportunistically abuse the trust inherent in market transac-
tions.128 Accordingly, contract law provides a mechanism by which those 
who wish to participate in the market can render themselves vulnerable to 
retaliation in the event that they breach their agreements.129  
Compare this account of contract law with so-called civil recourse 
theory in tort law. Zipursky and Goldberg have argued that tort law allows 
victims to hold wrongdoers accountable.130 It does this by rendering tortfea-
sors vulnerable to private rights of action, allowing victims to act against 
those that have wronged them.131 The normative foundations that civil re-
course theorists offer for tort law are quite different from the previously 
mentioned market-based argument in defense of contract law. For civil re-
course theory, tort law is primarily an ex post response to wrongdoing 
which is concerned mainly with the moral standing of the victim vis-à-vis 
the wrongdoer.132 In contrast, the theory of contract law as a market-
sustaining institution focuses on the moral desirability of a particular social 
practice (markets) and sees the law primarily as supporting that practice 
rather than vindicating the moral claims of particular individuals.133 What 
these theories share with one another is not a common set of moral con-
cerns. Rather, what they share is a common interest in justifying the imposi-
tion of a common legal status—civil liability—albeit for quite different 
reasons. 
For purposes of the theory of civil liability offered in this Article, what 
is important is not the final merit of any particular theory of contract law or 
tort law. Rather, it is the claim that what unifies fields of private law is not 
any particular set of normative concerns. Private law seems to be morally 
pluralistic, and we should not expect it to center on a single normative goal 
  
 126 Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183, 204 
(2012) (“By limiting opportunism, lowering transaction costs, inculcating moral attitudes conducive to 
market exchange, and the like, contract law makes widespread exchange between strangers easier and 
more likely.”). 
 127 See generally id.  
 128 Id. at 209 (“[T]he availability of formal recourse in the event of breach gives market partici-
pants the confidence to engage in transactions that they would otherwise forgo out of fear of exploita-
tion.”). 
 129 See Oman, Consent to Retaliation, supra note 56, at 533. 
 130 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 100, at 1846-47. 
 131 See id. 
 132 See Solomon, supra note 102, at 1806. 
 133 Oman, supra note 126, at 185-87. 
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such as corrective justice. Despite this pluralism, however, private law 
hangs together in a normative sense. What unites it is civil liability. Its 
normative unity lies not in the fact that it pursues a single normative goal, 
but that rendering defendants vulnerable to attack by plaintiffs advances all 
the normative goals it pursues. 
CONCLUSION  
As a concept, civil liability is rather less grand than the idea of law it-
self. It is rather more abstract, however, than particular areas of law such as 
tort and contract—let alone concrete doctrines such as negligence or 
breach. Occupying an intermediate position, it has garnered relatively little 
attention in contemporary debates in the philosophy of law. This is unfortu-
nate. First, civil liability is one of the most ubiquitous legal phenomena that 
we encounter. If we take the work of the courts as a measure, it is more 
common than criminal punishment, a concept that has garnered far more 
attention. Its very omnipresence ought to make it worthy of attention. Se-
cond, civil liability is striking in the way that it unites apparently disparate 
fields of law. Tort law and contract law are quite different in terms of both 
their goals and their structures. They both, however, result in civil liability. 
Focusing on the concept of civil liability thus provides us with a mechanism 
for thinking about their relationship to one another. 
Ultimately, the ideas of duty and cost, which are the most common 
ways of thinking about civil liability, do a poor job of capturing its basic 
structure. Both approaches tend to assume that civil liability is a mechanism 
by which the state coerces the conduct of defendants, either in the payment 
of a fine or the performance of some obligation. What these approaches 
miss is the primary role of the plaintiff’s agency in civil liability. Civil lia-
bility does not ultimately consist of the state coercing a recalcitrant individ-
ual. Rather, it consists of rendering a defendant vulnerable to a plaintiff and 
then placing tools at the disposal of the plaintiff to take or restrict the de-
fendant’s property and liberty. Placing vulnerability at the center of our 
understanding of civil liability, in turn, provides a fulcrum for understand-
ing its purposes and the way in which it relates otherwise disparate fields of 
law to one another. 
